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on June 19, 2006. In an introduction written by Dag G. Aasland, the title of the report 
“The Ethical Condition of Knowledge” and its meaning are discussed. Here, the 
Levinasian ethical perspective on knowledge is presented, viewing as it does the 
development of knowledge as a response to the questioning of others. In the first 
contribution following this introduction, Asbjørn Aarnes presents the philosophy of 
Levinas as a response to that of Heidegger. Secondly, Ole Andres Bjerkeset discusses 
the question of whether one can speak of “meaningful knowledge” according to 
Levinas. Finally, Roger Burggraeve demonstrates the manner in which Levinas’ 
knowledge is imparted when applied in the service of justice. 
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Introduction 
by Dag G. Aasland1 
 
The three contributions following this introduction were all presented at a seminar held 
at Agder University College in Kristiansand in June 2006, commemorating Emmanuel 
Levinas one hundred years after his birth.2 
 
Why the title “The Ethical Condition of Knowledge?” Given the fact that the seminar 
has taken place at an academic institution, it is natural to focus on knowledge. 
Moreover, when dealing with Levinas, one cannot escape “the ethical condition.” 
However, it is not only for these reasons we chose to address “the ethical condition of 
knowledge.” I will argue below that the heritage from Levinas itself inevitably leads us 
to this theme. 
 
The title indicates that the ethics resulting from the acquisition or possession of 
knowledge – a topic that has received much attention through its relation to so-called 
“professional” and “research ethics” – will not be discussed in depth. Rather, the title 
is meant to focus on how knowledge follows ethics: According to Levinas, ethics 
always comes first in answering the call to respond to the Other. However, parallel to 
the encounter with the Other is a confrontation with the third, and one is thus forced to 
compare and to judge these encounters. In order to achieve a higher degree of justice 
from this process, more knowledge is continually required. In this manner the search 
for knowledge follows ethics. In other words, in this introduction I want to focus on 
the “response-ability” of knowledge, meaning the ability of knowledge to fill the 
response from the subject to the Other – and to the third – with a content that gives 
meaning to all parts involved. After having accomplished this, the question remains: Is 
it not also a consequence of Levinas that the ultimate criterion for what is relevant 
knowledge is that the person or the profession possessing it is also responsible for it in 
the sense that one is able to defend it with respect to justice? I will claim that an 
affirmative answer to this question can be supported by the discussions in this report. 
 
In the first of the following contributions, Asbjørn Aarnes brings us from the 
fundamental ontology of Heidegger to the fundamental ethics of Levinas. Through 
doing so, Levinas clears a space for something that precedes ontology, or, as he 
                                                 
1 Dag G. Aasland is Professor of Economics at Agder University College.                                                                                           
2 I wish to thank Karin Lee-Hansen for the English proof-reading. 
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himself says, something that is “more ontological than ontology3.” This can be 
explained as follows: The basic ontological question of what is meant by being is 
closely connected to language, as it is by using language we declare something as 
being. However, Levinas insists that ethics is more basic than this: Ethics already 
exists before any language is used. What is “more ontological than ontology” is the 
call to respond to the person addressing me, not by what he says, but from the fact that 
he speaks to me. 
 
To say that ethics comes before ontology is another way of saying that ethics – and not 
ontology – is the primary source of meaning. Meaning is not, as may be supposed, 
found through a search for knowledge about the world or what is. Meaning is found in 
ethics, in being an I-for-the-other, separated from any knowledge creation. Is this 
equivalent to saying that knowledge is degraded from being the carrier of meaning to 
becoming void of meaning? Is knowledge according to Levinas meaningless? Has the 
term “meaningful knowledge” been by a single Levinasian stroke turned from being a 
pleonasm to becoming an oxymoron? This question is addressed by Ole Andreas 
Bjerkeset in the next section. He concludes that Levinas believes it is in fact 
meaningful to speak of “meaningful knowledge.” This conclusion is followed up by 
the last contribution to this report in which Roger Burggraeve gives an extraordinary 
clear presentation of the philosophy of Levinas and through this presentation discusses 
how the works of Levinas provide a new understanding of both knowledge and the 
meaningfulness of knowledge. The call both from the Other and from the third (who is 
also the Other), someone who may be an employer, a colleague, or a stranger, inspires 
me to seek knowledge that is required to continuously obtain an even better justice. 
 
In academia we like to tell ourselves that our knowledge at some point in history was 
liberated from being dogmatic to becoming critical. We wish to think that this break 
from dogmatism marked the end of a naïveté in the belief in an objective truth applied 
once and for all to every human being. However, as Levinas asks in his appraisal of 
Derrida’s work: “Are we again at the end of a naïveté, of an unsuspected dogmatism 
which slumbered at the base of that which we took for critical spirit?”4   Otherwise 
stated: Are all the theories we love to construct during our academic endeavors 
nothing but “old wine in new bottles” in the sense that they are assumed to be assigned 
                                                 
3 Levinas, E. Of God Who Comes to Mind. Stanford University Press 1998, p. 90. 
4 Levinas, E. “Wholly Otherwise”. In Bernasconi, R. and S. Critchley, Re-Reading Levinas. Indiana University 
Press 1991, p. 3. 
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the same status of objective truths as the previous dogmas? And yet perhaps this 
question is not the least bit important; all theories as well as all “old” dogmas belong 
to the realm of ontology, that is, to the world of what is declared to be. Consequently, 
as already mentioned, they depend on language, and thus (according to Levinas) they 
are founded upon – and are not foundations for – ethics. 
 
In today’s society academic institutions are scrutinised and placed under pressure to 
become more commercially oriented. A common reaction from academics to these 
attacks is to speak warmly for a return to “the good old days” when they could 
cultivate their own theories without being disturbed and questioned by anyone outside 
their own circles. According to Levinas, this has become an increasingly difficult form 
of retreat: The “I” becomes an “I” by being questioned, not only by his peers, but also 
by the totally different Other. In the world of academia, this acknowledgement may 
chart a way of meeting the pressure for too much commercialisation, or, to remain 
within business terminology, of setting a benchmark for knowledge creation that is 
both deeper and higher than that of always attaining higher profits. 
 
The fact that all development as well as dissemination of knowledge depends on 
language implies that these activities have to be, as language is itself, intersubjective; 
that is, they take place between subjects within a common socio-cultural space. But the 
question may therefore be posed as to whether there is anything real that is invariable 
and universally valid, independent from all these socio-cultural contexts. Stated 
otherwise, is there a reality independent of the numerous socio-culturally conditioned 
discourses in which development and dissemination of knowledge, and thus also a 
continuous change in this knowledge, take place? In answer to this question, many 
people would reply that the invariable “fixed point” is the outer world, the empirically 
given, before it is interpreted by humans, perhaps even before it is observed, as 
observations also imply both selection and interpretation. However, even with this 
fixed point consisting of a physical reality as a common point of departure, an 
abundance of different discourses seems to run in all possible directions (what Jean-
François Lyotard5 calls language games). This holds true unless there is also another 
fixed point, one that all discourses (or language games) have as a common, underlying 
aim (beyond the more trivial purpose of solving practical and economic problems). It 
could be a point upon which they all converge, a point which (along with the first 
                                                 
5 Lyotard, J.-F. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Translated from the French by Geoff 
Beninton and Brian Massumi. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1984. 
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fixed point of a common outer world) constitutes the two poles between which all 
discourses move. From Levinas – and from the following contributions – we learn that 
there is such a second fixed point which is the Other, and which can assume the shape 
of any other human being, someone to whom I as a separate being will have to answer 
in any specific actual encounter. 
 
Before elaborating further on this point, let me first summarise what has been said so 
far by claiming that there are two “fixed points” that are independent of the 
intersubjective and socio-cultural conditioned discourses and their respective 
“knowledges.” These two points are: 
1. The outer world; that is, physical objects and indisputable events  
2. The Other, experienced as a call to respond with something for which I 
must account 
 
All discourses and all knowledge fill the space between these two fixed points with a 
content that varies in accordance with time and space. In fact, what the subject does 
when he is called upon to respond to another person addressing him – at this point he 
has no other options – is to refer to something that is (there and then) known by both. 
This may either be the common, outer world, or it may also be a “truth” extracted from 
some other commonly known discourse. In any case, the way to making this response 
is to go into one of the many possible discourses that are known to both. According to 
Levinas, it is exactly in the response to the call from another person that language and 
knowledge are constructed. Knowledge is the product of the efforts of the subject to 
respond in a credible way to the questioning from the Other. Only by going into some 
temporarily existing intersubjective discourses can the subject respond to the call from 
the other person, because it is only in this manner that the subject can refer to 
something that is commonly known to both. In other words, it is only by applying 
existing knowledge through discourse and its related language that the subject may 
behave responsibly towards the Other. 
 
Theories are good examples of such constructions. Theories are constructed in order to 
form a meaning within an intersubjective, socio-cultural context (such as a scientific 
paradigm), through connecting the outer world with the need of the subject to account 
for some question in a credible way. 
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In all enterprises engaged in development and dissemination of theories and other 
forms of knowledge, such as in an academic institution, it may be useful to keep these 
two fixed points clearly in mind in order to understand and accept that both the 
(parallel) ongoing discourses and their related “areas of knowledge” may change 
according to time and context, in form as well as in content. The ultimate criterion of 
truth within each discourse, then, must be whether what is said is considered to be a 
credible response from one subject to the other. 
 
How then is knowledge actually developed from this basic event of responding to the 
call from another person? It is widely known that with regard to any subject, there is 
always more than one other person to whom one must relate. One will always have to 
deal with several other people, while at the same time each individual in turn may play 
the role as the one to whom the subject is called to respond. Thus it will not be 
sufficient to respond to only one other person. What is said must also be accounted for 
to any possible third party. This implies that the subject has to be aware that his 
response to the other must also be credible to other Others; one will have to account 
for what is said to more than only the one person one is at that moment addressing.  
The awareness of this possibility works as a disciplining force on all players of the 
discourses that develop and disseminate knowledge. Rules of scientific method, 
(consistency, reliability, validity etc.) as well as other explicit criteria of truth within 
any given discourse may be understood based on what are these basically ethical 
conditions. 
 
To summarise, the fact that there exists more than one other person to address 
determines what is held to be “true” in the sense of being credible in any discourse; 
that is, in anything that is said by a subject as a response to the presence of another 
person. What is said and claimed as true must be understood within the discourse as a 
sincere attempt to be for the others. This means that the subject must enter into the 
discourse with the intention of making a sincere attempt to achieve an always more 
just balance among different (and sometimes opposing) interests. In these attempts one 
will never attain perfection; nonetheless, achieving credibility will depend on whether 
one is believed to do one’s best in the effort of balancing all possible interests: 
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“… justice remains justice only in a society where there is no distinction 
between those close and those far off, but in which there also remains the 
impossibility of passing by the closest.”6  
 
------ 
 
The consequences of this Levinasian lesson on knowledge appear to be huge. Gone are 
the days when an academic could cultivate his own ideas without the fear of being 
disturbed and questioned by anyone outside his own circle. On the other hand, 
knowledge produced for the single purpose of increasing profit, for either an 
individual enterprise or the academic institution itself, will not be able to account for 
itself faced with both the Other and the third. 
 
Must not the conclusion be that all development and dissemination of knowledge will 
have to account for the purpose of justice in order to be credible (including a credible 
definition of the word “justice”)? Can knowledge be legitimate if it is not applicable in 
the service of justice? These are fundamental questions posed from both 
acknowledging the profound questioning of Levinas and reading the following 
contributions. The answers cannot be found within merely another discourse. On the 
contrary, it remains to be seen in the time to come; no single individual is in the 
position of being able to answer on behalf of humanity. 
                                                 
6 Levinas, E. Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence. Kluwer Academic Press 1991, p. 159 
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Heidegger and Levinas 
by Asbjørn Aarnes7 
 
Speaking about Heidegger and Levinas is a demanding assignment, as they must be 
two of the most difficult philosophers in the history of philosophy. Moreover, they are 
so entangled in each other that it is difficult to tell where one ends and the other 
begins. In a presentation such as this, it is important to grasp the essentials of both  
Heidegger’s and Levinas’ writings. I will make this attempt and conclude by 
highlighting one topic which is of great contemporary value.  
 
The situation regarding Levinas in Norway is quite unique. His philosophy has had 
repercussions on various fields of study, for example medicine, pedagogy and (to a 
certain extent) theology. In addition, we must mention Dag Aasland’s contribution, 
which expands the Levinasian sphere to include economics. As regards the Norwegian 
situation in particular, much more might be added to this list. For example, courses 
have been organised at different hospitals; at the Deaconess’ Hospital in Oslo, and, 
more recently, at the new University Hospital in Akershus, where Levinas’ philosophy 
has been integrated in its planning stages. Viewed from a traditional understanding of 
philosophy, this seems extraordinary. If it were a question of Thomas Aquinas’ or 
Cartesian philosophy, it would be considered dogmatism. It would merely be a 
declaration of intent, excluding some points while admitting a very few. However, 
Levinas’ philosophy has a particular quality: it is very complicated but simultaneously 
very elementary. Levinas himself has said: ”My philosophy begins before Philosophy, 
and ends after Philosophy.” Thus when these hospitals use it as part of their 
foundation, this is the essence that animates them, i.e. to receive the Other. This is in 
accordance with Levinas’ fundamental belief, which he stresses when stating that 
philosophy comes after diaconia, after concern and care. Thus there is no particular 
interpretation that justifies his philosophy; we only have his word on it. (If it is of 
interest to obtain more information concerning Levinas’ philosophy being utilised in 
this context, an article on this topic written by the former chief medical superintendent 
of Akershus University Hospital appeared in Dagsavisen on 10.10.05.) 
 
However, let us next move on to the given topic, i.e. the relationship between 
Heidegger and Levinas. First a few biographical notes: Levinas met Heidegger in 
1928, when he went to Freiburg to study. It was not intended that he would develop a 
                                                 
7 Asbjørn Aarnes is Professor Emeritus of European Literature at the University of Oslo. 
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relationship with Heidegger. He went to Freiburg to listen to Husserl, who was 
conducting his final seminar that year before retiring. As Levinas himself has 
explained, ”I went to find Husserl, but I found Heidegger.” Heidegger was already 
attracting attention beside his master, Edmund Husserl, an attention which captivated 
Levinas. Thus when writing about the great names in the history of philosophy, he 
mentions Heidegger, not Husserl. This relationship with Heidegger, which began in 
Freiburg, developed different aspects over the years, and lasted until his final works 
were completed. Burggraeve, who has assembled his bibliography, will be able to 
relate this story in a more complete version. I believe Heidegger’s name is the one that 
appears most often in his works. 
 
I will not delve more deeply into Levinas’ period of study in Freiburg, but will 
mention one event: Heidegger’s invitation to Levinas to participate in the Conference 
of Davos in 1929. It was a memorable conference of which Ernst Cassirer and 
Heidegger were the leading figures, but their roles were reversed; Cassirer, the 
Kantian, lectured on Heidegger, and Heidegger lectured on Kant. Levinas’ great 
discovery in reading Heidegger’s chef d’oeuvre, Sein und Zeit (Being and Time), is 
that sein – to be – is a verb, not a substantive. This signifies a turning away from 
French essentialism towards a philosophy of existence, i.e. Heidegger’s fundamental 
ontology. Sein is a verb of action. It denotes an event which is audible, if not visible.  
 
The other great biographical event between Heidegger and Levinas is, of course, their 
relationship to Nazism. We know that Heidegger was appointed Vice Chancellor of 
the University of Freiburg, and that he treated Husserl in a demeaning fashion. 
Heidegger had become a member of the German Nazi Party (a lamentable chapter in 
the history of philosophy). When Hans Jonas returned from the United States after the 
war, he wanted to see his old teachers, and Heidegger had been his great master. He 
had failed, and Jonas regarded it as a tragedy, not merely on the personal scale, but 
also a tragedy for philosophy as a whole. However, there was also a lesser German 
philosopher, Ebbinghaus, whom Jonas wanted to visit. Ebbinghaus had not failed, and 
Jonas went to see him to thank him for not having yielded to the temptation of Nazism. 
Ebbinghaus replied quite modestly,  “All of this is due to Kant. I am obliged to Kant 
for everything. But for Kant, I should not have had the strength to resist.” For Jonas it 
is significant that the great, brilliant one failed, whereas the mediocre, insignificant 
one resisted the temptation of falling in with evil.  
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The reaction against Heidegger for his relationship to Nazism was and is violent in its 
nature. One of the first phenomenologists, Roman Ingarden, never reconciled with 
Heidegger. When Ingarden was lecturing in Oslo, he remarked, ”Phenomenology was 
destroyed by the two H’s: Hitler and Heidegger.” Levinas never said that. One may 
ask whether he tried to excuse Heidegger when stating that Heidegger was seduced by 
Hitler, not by Nazism. It may sound like a strange form of excuse. It seems to indicate 
that something personal, something existential, determined Heidegger’s choice. There 
was also a massive condemnation of Heidegger in France among people less affected 
by Nazism than Levinas, who spent the war years in a German concentration camp and 
lost his whole family in Lithuania. It is not evident that that was due to the Germans, 
for the Lithuanians also turned against the enemies of Germany in their own country. 
Lithuania was occupied by the Russians, as we know, and they regarded the Germans 
as liberators. At any rate, Levinas’ entire family was eradicated. A Swedish journalist 
once asked him, ”Will you not be going to Lithuania since you will be so close to it 
when in Sweden?,” he replied, ”Never, ever, again!” 
 
These were the external circumstances surrounding the situation. 
 
 
Heidegger’s Presence in Levinas’ Work 
There are two phases in Heidegger’s philosophy. The first is associated with Sein und 
Zeit, the second has been called: the ”turning to the poets.” In Levinas’ philosophy we 
also find two phases: the first one, which is mainly associated with his essay, On 
Evasion (De l’évasion’, 1936), and the second, which is associated with the bulk of his 
work. It comprises his doctoral thesis of 1961, Totality and Infinity. An Essay on 
Exteriority as well as his remarkable thesis with the mysterious title, Autrement 
qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence, which literally means: ”Beyond Being, or Beyond the 
Being of Being.””Essence” in this context does not mean what we traditionally think 
of as ”essence.” Rather, it is the verbal substantive of ”esse”, ”essence” (”essance”), 
being’s being - that is, a continuous being. There is also his work from 1982, De Dieu 
qui vient à l’idée – ”Of God Who Comes to Mind”. I should also like to mention The 
Humanism of the Other, which has been translated into Norwegian. It is considered to 
be significant as it represents a transition between the two phases of Levinas’ 
philosophy. 
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Upon comparing Heidegger and Levinas, one notices that the first phase of Heidegger 
is manifested in Levinas, in the initial phase of his philosophy. The philosophy of the 
young Levinas, which is associated with his essay On Evasion, is somehow a form of 
fundamental ontology, as is the case with Heidegger, since ”being” plays its central 
part. However, it is not a similar notion of ”being” that we encounter in Heidegger. To 
him, Being is before all ”beings”. Being is sovereign to the extent that one might say 
that it is man’s ”home.” Moreover, the forgetfulness of being has led to the failure of 
the West, to our becoming displaced and cast into the flow of time. The goal of this 
first phase is to overcome the forgetfulness of being and regain the fullness of being. It 
is like an echo of the Greek anamnesis – the remembering. The task of Dasein  
(human existence) is to reinstate oneself in being. In order to achieve this, mankind has 
only one means: death. Heidegger elaborates on Cicero’s words: ”To philosophise is to 
learn to die.” In Heidegger it is not a question of learning to die, but rather one of 
returning to being, and that is rendered possible only by confronting death. He 
challenges his opponent, which is death, and conquers it by dying his own death. Thus 
one might say that the first phase of Heidegger’s philosophy teaches a kind of heroism; 
authentic life depends on heroic action, as opposed to inauthentic life, which is ”one’s” 
life. 
 
Being also plays the leading role for the young Levinas, but his relationship to being is 
totally different from Heidegger’s. According to Levinas, there is no heroism. He has 
noticed that there is something superhuman, or rather inhuman, about being. ”It tramps 
along on its own,” as he put it. It tramps along on its own. It is both unable to be 
ashamed and unable to show consideration. Being is beyond the capabilities of man. 
Thus Levinas feels it is a question of escaping the onus of being. In Levinas, 
Heidegger’s creative, sovereign being has become a burden that crushes man. He asks 
at one point, “What is humanity, and what is humanity’s relationship to being?” To 
Heidegger, humanity is heroism, while to Levinas, humanity is ”the being that weeps.” 
(L’humanité, c’est l’être qui pleure”)  Like so many of Levinas’ statements, it is a 
metaphor of profound significance in which we sense that Heidegger’s philosophy of 
power has become a philosophy of powerlessness. As Zygmunt Bauman – whose 
philosophical foundation is rooted in Levinas – has put it: ”Face is not force.”  
 
In the second phase of Heidegger’s philosophy, his ”turning to the poets” (Hölderlin, 
Trakl, Stefan George and others), heroism has disappeared. Man has been given the 
task of being Being’s shepherd. Levinas does not like this phase in Heidegger. He says 
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somewhere that it is ”less accessible to control.” This is not a Levinasian expression, 
for ”control” is not particularly high on his agenda. He probably misses logical thought 
and argumentation. Sein und Zeit was his great discovery, which remains a continuing 
inspiration not only for acceptance but also rejection. In the beginning Levinas follows 
in Heidegger’s footsteps, but in his second phase he parts from Heidegger and leaves 
Being behind – it is the end of ontology (”Fin de l’ontologie”). 
 
It is the ’late’ Levinasian philosophy that is best known and connected with the 
epiphany of the face. We will not elaborate on how this happens. Nor is it possible to 
trace how the face appears. It is suddenly there – the face of the Other, the face of 
another human being. The end of ontology turns out to be the introduction to Levinas’ 
fundamental ethics. In this phase Heidegger only plays a secondary, cautionary role. If 
one had a look at his outline for aesthetics from 1947, one might perceive a certain 
continuation of Heidegger’s influence, but it is the face of the Other that remains the 
beacon, the lodestar that shows both the meaning and direction of Levinas’ 
philosophy. This is where his great influence makes itself felt. This turning toward the 
face of the Other is the great event, and we have both heard and hear in his writings 
that ’the face’ is not what the sculptor sees. Neither is it what the photographer 
photographs, or the painter paints, or the physiologist observes. It is not a visual but 
rather an audible face, the first that speaks to us in the world, issuing the following 
command: ”Thou shalt not kill!” (Exodus 20). There is another reference that is 
relevant for Levinas in the Book of Kings (Kings I 19: 11-13): The prophet Elijah lives 
through a storm, an earthquake and a fire. In the end ”there came the sound of a gentle 
breeze,” i.e. a natural sound. Levinas translates the same quotation as ”the voice of 
feeble silence” (”la voix du fin silence”) – it is the voice of God who is speaking in the 
face of the Other. But it is a God who is no longer in heaven; he is only accessible 
through the face of the Other.  
 
A New Davos? 
Although Levinas developed his philosophy in a direction turning away from 
Heidegger’s own thoughts on being, the latter did meet him at a central point in his 
philosophy. At a seminar in Zurich in 1951, when the discussion turned to the 
phenomenon of ontological difference, Heidegger was asked: ”Can God and Being 
(Sein) be posited as identical?” In his answer, Heidegger opens a new line of thought 
in relation to his former fundamental ontology: 
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”I am asked this question almost every other week; it seems that this concept 
preoccupies the theologians. It is connected with the Europeanisation of history, 
which started in the Middle Ages, when Aristotle and Plato entered the arena of 
theology found in the New Testament. This is a process whose serious 
implications cannot be exaggerated. I have asked a Jesuit, who was friendly to 
me, to show me the texts in Thomas Aquinas, where it might be explained what 
’esse’ (being) actually signifies, and what the sentence Deus est suum esse (God 
is his [own] being) implies, but I never received a reply... God and Being (Sein) 
are not identical, and I should never try to think of God’s essence from Being. 
Some of you perhaps know that I started out from theology, and that I have kept 
my love for it. If I were to write a theology, to which I am often tempted, the 
word Sein would not be found there.” 
 
He further points out that faith does not need Being. If it does so, it is then no longer 
faith. While Luther understood this idea (”Sola fide!”), his church seems to have 
forgotten it. Heidegger concludes his answer with the following remarks: ”As concerns 
Being, nothing can be done. I am very modest when I consider Being with a view to its 
suitability to perceiving God’s being theologically. ... I think that being must never be 
thought of as God’s foundation and essence, but that the experience of God and the 
revelation of God nevertheless take place (insofar as man has this experience) in the 
dimension of being, but that it in no way indicates that being might be a possible 
predicate of God. Here, new distinctions are needed.” (Martin Heidegger, 
Gesamtausgabe, vol. 15, pp. 425-439). 
 
This is where Heidegger comes close to the ’late’ Levinas’ philosophy, which seeks 
beyond ”the being of Being”, beyond the emergence or event of being. The most 
important event according to Levinas takes place outside Being both during the 
encounter with the face of the Other and in the glimpse of God in that face. Thus he 
says that Hamlet does not reach the core in his question of ”to be or not to be.” The 
God who acts through the face and only there, which Levinas at one point calls ”the 
voice of feeble silence” and at another the illéité (“being He”) has no Being; ”He” acts 
without Being. 
 
This experience of transcendence is not limited to theology. Linguistics, the 
philosophy of language, contains a similar phenomenon. When it asserts that the 
smallest semantic units of language (phonemes) are elements of form, not of content 
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(Roman Jacobsen), it means that while the diacritical aspects do act, they do so 
without Being. 
 
This experience of transcendence gives direction and meaning to Levinas’ philosophy. 
The fact that Heidegger comes closer to Levinas in Switzerland is reminiscent of the 
Davos Conference when Levinas, as Heidegger’s personal guest, met fundamental 
ontology de vive voix.  
 
In conclusion, I will look at Levinas’ philosophy in light of the history of philosophy. 
His philosophy arrived at a point in time which is called ”the era of crises” (Ricœur), 
when many “losses” were registered. What had already been lost for centuries was the 
loss of the world. Cartesian idealism makes it clear that philosophers know with more 
certainty that the ego exists than that the world exists. Descartes does not need God to 
know who he is and that he is. But he needs God to know that things are. There have 
been questions in existence regarding the world that have tantalised philosophers for 
centuries. 
 
Another loss is linked to the nineteenth century and the philosophy of suspicion as it is 
found in Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, and even such an unsuspecting philosopher (or 
philologist) as Ferdinand de Saussure. This suspicion (perhaps better articulated by 
Ricœur than by anyone else) implies that the knowledge of self is also uncertain.  
Descartes believed that while knowledge of the world is uncertain, knowledge of self 
is certain. Today, however, even the knowledge of self is lost. You can no longer sit 
down, like Descartes, search yourself and find the truth. Why? Because you may be 
altered and influenced by your financial status, race, class, etc. Thus, your 
understanding of yourself is false, a false consciousness. This is the double loss that 
faces Levinas, a factor he takes into account. Therefore we understand him when he 
states that one has to have lost something in order to understand his fundamental 
ethics. If a person is perfectly content, he will not be able to discover anything in his 
philosophy. It is Levinas himself who spells this out, and I imagine that I understand 
him. Moreover, if we go further and ask: “What is left after such a loss: nothing?”, the 
face of the Other looms over us with a new certainty. If we regard this from the point 
of view of the history of philosophy, we know that ontology originated with Aristotle, 
who formulated the question: “What was to be?” It is not “What is to be?”, but “What 
was to be?” This is the introduction to the form of science which is still asking what 
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was to be. It is the introduction to ontology, which is struck down by crisis, even a 
double crisis: the knowledge of the world, and the knowledge of self.  
 
The other question of origin is Jewish, deriving from the question “Where is your 
brother, Abel?” This marks the introduction of ethics into the philosophy of Western 
thought. It is this question, says Levinas, that has never lost its relevance, but rather 
has remained intact through all crises. Here I will allow myself to mention a metaphor, 
one which reminds us of the Flood. Noah sends birds from the Ark; some return, 
others do not. However, in the end, after many days and weeks have passed and the 
earth has begun to dry up, a very special dove returns holding an olive branch in its 
beak, which serves as testimony that the world is once more habitable. 
 
If we regard Levinas from this perspective, one may say that the Holocaust, during 
which six million Jews lost their lives, was a new Flood (Levinas himself lost nearly 
his entire family with the exception of his wife and children, who were in hiding in 
France). The face might then be compared to the new olive branch which testified that 
the world was habitable again. The face moves beyond every individual context – “I 
see a face.” It is a message from the outside: the world is again a place where man may 
live. 
 
Translated by Mette Nygård 
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What is Meaningful Knowledge? 
by Ole Andreas Bjerkeset8 
 
The title of my paper is the question “What is meaningful knowledge?” This is clearly 
a philosophical question, yet is not one that has been posed very often by philosophers. 
Why? The reason is that in the history of philosophy knowledge usually in and of itself 
is regarded as meaningful. According to philosophical tradition, knowing something is 
already an encounter with meaning, which is thereby not something that is added to 
knowledge from outside knowledge itself. Knowledge is meaning precisely insofar as 
it is just that: knowledge. But not only is knowledge regarded as an instance of 
meaning, it is also viewed as the very paradigm of meaning. Knowledge is meaning 
par excellence. Consider, for example, Aristotle’s claim in the opening line of the 
Metaphysics: “By nature, all men desire to know.” This is not some random 
characteristic, but points to the very essence of man. What defines man, according to 
Aristotle, is not the fact that he walks upright; nor is it Shakespearian passions. What 
defines man is the capacity for reason, the possibility of living a life in accordance 
with this capacity and of employing it in research and contemplation of the first 
principles of thought and universe. Symptomatically, Aristotle clearly states in his 
Nichomachean Ethics that it is the bios theoretikos, the contemplative life, which 
yields the highest form of happiness.  
 
Obviously, this is not just the tendency in Aristotle, but in all Greek philosophy and, 
consequently, the general tendency in subsequent philosophies until today. The classic 
paradigm is that of the Platonic myth of the soul as set forth in the Phaedrus. What life 
is really about is the drama of the soul, which at birth finds itself cast into exile, 
delivered into oblivion, but which nonetheless retains a vague sense of home and 
belonging. The journey home, however, is not made by climbing mountains and 
crossing rivers, but by recollecting a knowledge that the soul enjoyed before the fall 
into the body. But this knowledge regained does not constitute a map that would 
indicate this lost home. Home is not a place: it is knowledge itself.    
 
We understand then that the question “What is meaningful knowledge?” is not itself 
automatically meaningful. There is obviously no problem in asking “What is 
knowledge?” as is asked in Plato’s Theaetetus, nor is it a problem asking the question 
“What is meaning?.” However, the question “What is meaningful knowledge?” is not 
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so easily posed. According to the tradition already cited, this question would probably 
have to be viewed as tautological. The question “What is meaningful knowledge?” 
would then seem equivalent to the question “What is meaningful meaning?” Should 
the question be considered meaningful, one would therefore first have to call into 
question this venerable tradition that names knowledge as being the destiny of man. 
This is obviously not an easy endeavour, but it is exactly the undertaking that the 
French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas is attempting. 
 
Levinas asks if it is obvious that knowledge is the measure of meaning. Is it really 
knowledge that constitutes the essence of the human being? Is there not something in 
the drama of being human that is better than knowledge, which exceeds the adequacy 
of thought and being? Does there not exist a relationship with the world, or if the 
concept of world sounds too Heideggerian, a relationship as such that is not one of 
knowledge, and that is not only meaningful, but in fact also creates the order of 
meaning? Levinas points to the encounter with another human being and claims that 
this encounter is different from the encounter with the world, which is consummated in 
knowledge. There is obviously a sense in which another human being is in the world 
and as such something to know, but there is also a sense in which this other human 
being is not of the world and in which it resists being known. This resistance, however, 
is not a violent resistance; nor is the inability to encompass the other a result of an 
insufficient reason. This inability is not caused by a lack of ability, as if a reason better 
equipped would be capable of knowing the other. The resistance is ethical and of a 
peaceful nature.  
 
This resistance is consequently not a result of force, as it is constituted by the absence 
of force; it is the resistance of weakness, a weakness of such little strength that it 
seems to fall out of being altogether. It is as if it cannot maintain itself in being. It is as 
if this resistance creates a gap in being itself, but this gap is not the one Sartre was 
speaking of when he said that the other was a gap in the world. According to Sartre, 
this gap constitutes a void, a nothingness, but Levinas traces something else in the face 
of the Other: he traces the overflowing of infinity that speaks of a responsibility 
without end. There is an inscription in the face of the Other that cannot be read, but 
only heard, and this inscription is not in the indicative, but rather in the imperative. It 
is the commandment “Thou shalt not commit murder.” This commandment is not an 
appeal to our understanding, and it is not content that must first be understood by 
reason before it can take effect. The face of the Other makes a claim on us before 
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consciousness enters the arena. When consciousness wakes up, something has already 
happened. I am responsible for the Other without ever signing up for this 
responsibility. Consciousness was never offered the opportunity to reject it. It arrived 
too late, as the decision had already been made. But the point here is also that it would 
always arrive too late. However strenuous the efforts of consciousness to stay awake 
would have been, it would still always arrive too late, and the reason is that this 
vigilance is precisely that which in this case constitutes its sleep.  
 
The relationship with the face is not, then, that of intentionality, where consciousness 
is directed towards some object. If there is intentionality in this relationship, it is a 
reversed intentionality. The I does not act, but is acted upon; however, as we have 
already pointed out, it is not acted upon by a force, but rather by the absolute absence 
of force. This absence of force is, however, not the negation of force. The face is 
neither negation nor negativity. If that were the case, the weakness of the Other would 
still refer to force. It would still remain within the dialectic of force. The weakness of 
the Other is of another sort: it is not an inability that just lacks ability. It is weaker than 
a stone that does not have the ability to move itself. The Other is so weak that not only 
does this weakness fall short of being an object of the intentionality of consciousness, 
it returns as a claim made on this intentionality. The Other, Levinas says, is actually so 
weak that it makes a claim on us, so weak that this weakness becomes a demand.  
 
The face of the Other is the upsurge of the human in being. It is in terms of the 
responsibility for the Other that the human must be understood, though not in terms of 
knowledge nor in terms of the employment of certain cognitive powers. The face of 
the Other places a burden on me, but this burden also tells me who I am and why I am 
here in this world. This burden thus does not just weigh upon me; it also lifts me up 
and is itself uplifting. There is exaltation in this burden. This means that not only does 
there exist meaning outside the realm of knowledge, but this meaning is also the very 
measure of meaning: the face of the Other signifies par excellence. We may then 
conclude that there does indeed exist something in the drama of the human being that 
is better than knowledge, and this is the responsibility for the Other, or ethics. This is 
why Levinas claims that ethics cannot be a branch of philosophy, but must be 
considered the base of philosophy itself. There exists something better and more 
important than the insights that logic, theory of knowledge, philosophy of language 
and so on may yield. Ethics is not something that can wait for the philosopher to finish 
answering his questions. In this sense Levinas places a limitation on philosophy: no 
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matter how many questions are still left unanswered, one answer has been given before 
a question was even posed: I am responsible for the Other. This cannot be undone by 
any philosophy or inquiry. One may certainly enquire into the specifics of Levinas’ 
philosophy (one may even disagree with him), but when the Other faces, one leaves 
philosophy entirely to enter the realm of ethics, and of this realm I am not in charge. 
 
Levinas has then wrested the exclusivity of meaning from knowledge. Knowledge is 
no longer the paradigm or measure of meaning. But what happens to knowledge when 
it no longer enjoys this privileged position? Is knowledge still meaningful? Obviously, 
meaning is not something that can be ascribed by means of argumentation, nor is it 
accomplished by means of deduction. Meaning is a phenomenological event, and as 
such it does not need support from something extraneous to this self-revelation to 
retain its status as meaning. Meaning is not something that requires a basis, as it is 
something one simply encounters. According to this line of thought, if knowledge 
shows itself as being meaningful, then it cannot be without meaning.  
 
After reading Levinas, however, something may well still happen to this meaning that 
previously has been allocated to, and more importantly, encountered in the sphere of 
knowledge. In the philosopher’s case it is not unthinkable that the philosophy of 
Levinas would in fact make this meaning evaporate. Why is this so? The reason is that 
the meaning of ethics, which is meaning par excellence, overshadows all other 
meaning. With the face of the Other, the philosophical question of meaning is already 
answered, leaving no room for a realisation of the human as such in philosophical 
questioning itself. Meaning no longer consists in the quest for meaning; instead, the 
true site of meaning reveals this quest to be an illness which leads to death. The 
philosopher may paradoxically find himself in a situation where he no longer cares for 
knowledge, where he no longer is interested in posing the ever unanswerable question 
“Why?”. In ethics there is no “why?”. There is no time to ask this question. If you ask 
“why,” you are removed from the faces of others. However, when the Other faces you, 
the commandment that is inscribed in the face makes you choke on your question. 
Ethics puts knowledge to shame. The glory of the infinite in the face of the Other 
outstrips knowledge and questioning of all its grandeur and dignity.  
 
It seems then that our little investigation into the question “What is meaningful 
knowledge?” has led us to a conclusion that is the opposite of our starting point. 
Beginning with the question did not seem meaningful because knowledge in and of 
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itself was considered the measure of meaning. The meaningfulness of the question 
seemed accordingly to depend on calling into question the presumption that meaning 
and knowledge implicate each other. This calling into question of knowledge has, 
however, apparently led us to the conclusion that knowledge has no meaning at all.  
The vast field of knowledge and research would then be but a desert eclipsed by the 
face of the Other. 
 
Nonetheless, is it possible that the entire philosophical tradition from the ancient 
Greeks up to today could be so wrong in holding knowledge in such high regard? The 
answer to this question is perhaps both yes and no. What is clear after reading Levinas 
is that knowledge can no longer be regarded as the essence of the human being. The 
essence of the human being is in fact not an essence at all – it is the undoing of 
essence, a peaceful resistance that awakens consciousness to a responsibility for the 
other. Obviously, there is also some truth to the Aristotelian notion that happiness is 
found in the use of the abilities that are distinctive to the human species. And we most 
certainly would have to count happiness as an instance of meaning, although Levinas 
flatly rejects the notion that the essence of the human being has anything to do with 
happiness. 
 
Perhaps more importantly: When discussing Aristotle and the Greeks, we should also 
remember the emphasis that the Greeks put on public life and community. There is a 
big difference between a quest for knowledge that is disconnected from any human 
bond and inquiries that have already been highlighted by the human being. Not only 
are there contentions and arguments in the dialogues of Plato, but there are also faces. 
When Socrates and Theaetetus enquire into the essence of knowledge, it is not certain 
that they find themselves only within the realm of philosophy. The questions that 
Socrates poses to Theaetetus may well be an expression of Socrates’ being-for-the-
other.  
 
We understand then that meaningful knowledge derives its meaning from the ethical. 
It is because the human being already has ascribed meaning to the scene that 
knowledge is made meaningful, and that every significant human activity is 
meaningful. Without the meaning of the ethical, no meaning could ever survive. From 
this perspective, however, the meaningfullness of knowledge would perhaps not be 
very different from that of the meaningfullness of play. But there is also a sense in 
which knowledge not only is meaningful but also crucial. We may recall that ethics 
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begins with the face of the Other, or with an I facing an other. But these two are not 
alone in the world. There is the third party, which troubles the infinite responsibility 
for the Other. With the third party we are not only concerned with ethics but also with 
justice and, consequently, politics. And in the realm of the political, knowledge and 
reason return to the heart of the human being. It is still true that knowledge and reason 
no longer characterise the essence of the human being, but they are nonetheless 
essentially bound to the undoing of essence, which is the essence of the human being. 
Reason and knowledge are not to be regarded as accidental traits of human beings, but 
rather as necessary for the never-ending realisation of ethics which occurs in politics. 
It is as if the philosophers were in fact correct in holding knowledge and reason in 
such high regard. They just did not see the real reason why they did so. 
 
In conclusion, I would like to point out that in Levinas’ writings, meaning is a fragile 
thing. The ethical cannot for obvious reasons be secured in knowledge. It is when the 
Other faces one that the meaning of the ethical is incontestable. When this happens, 
even the Cartesian cogito does not measure up in terms of certainty. But we are not 
always present in this relationship to the Other, and when this occurs, meaning may be 
entirely absent. There is then a risk with respect to meaning in Levinas, because he has 
destroyed all the idols that pretend to be a source of meaning while simultaneously 
pointing to a true site of meaning that is fragility itself when it comes to securing 
meaning. Meaning is never secure in Levinas. The face of the Other is not a constant, 
bright light, but rather a blinking star, which one may doubt ever blinked in the first 
place when the light is gone. The Cartesian question then comes to mind: Who will 
carry me between two sets of evidence? Who will carry meaning between faces? In 
Levinas the ambiguity of meaning is never clarified. However, ethics is dependent 
upon this clarification never taking place. 
 
 
  27
The Meaning of Knowledge in the Service of Justice 
by Roger Burggraeve9 
 
Introduction 
In his ethical thought Levinas understands the relationship between justice and 
knowledge in two ways: first, on the level of the ethical relationship with the Other, 
where he develops the concept of justice in a broad sense. Secondly, it is understood 
on the level of the ethical relationship with the third ones, where justice is understood 
in a strict sense. To specify the originality of the Levinasian approach, we must first 
outline his critical view of the traditional western (Greek) concept of (reason as) 
knowledge.  
 
I. The Greek Love of Wisdom 
Since the time of the ancient Greeks, western tradition has developed as one that 
regards science and insight as constituting the grounds and conditions for adequate and 
responsible action. Philosophy came to be known as an attempt to conquer ‘doxa’ or 
‘opinion’ by means of reason (“heteronomous opinions”). Being as it is ‘the 
reasonable par excellence’, philosophy draws its entire nobility from this notion, 
whereby it has at the same time grown into the “solid basis of our old Europe.”  
 
Reason as the Victory Over Multiplicity and Alterity 
According to Greek thought, multiplicity is the origin of ‘opinion’ (doxa) and 
irrationality as well as conflict and violence. Furthermore, both opinion and violence 
are inextricably linked to one another. Our daily experience constantly brings us into 
contact with a tremendous amount of multiplicity and diversity, creating an 
unmanageable number of contradictions in the eye of the perceiver. The multiplicity of 
opinions expressed by humans (and gods) gives rise to never-ending discussions and 
oppositions. This never-ending discussion becomes a continuous source of annoyance 
in which the relationships between people are not based on harmony but rather on 
resentment, tension, opposition and conflict. According to Greek thought, violence 
may be attributed solely to the realities of multiplicity and diversity, meaning that 
violence is the product of the separation and rupture in being between the Same (the 
one) and the Other. Since multiplicity and diversity are the first experiences to present 
themselves to our powers of observation, the point seems obvious that war is the father 
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of all things: ‘polemos patèr pantoon’. 
 
It is clear that this phenomenology of reality in its conflict-ridden multiplicity and 
diversity evokes a particular concept of peace and harmony. The only possibility of 
annulling the violence that flows forth from the One and the Other consists in reducing 
everything to the Same; in other words, to assimilate the Other into the Same. This is 
precisely what philosophy as ‘love of wisdom’ – which is what the word “philosophy” 
literally means – sees as being its task. Philosophy thinks it can fulfil this task only by 
knowing. Indeed, knowing here is understood in a certain manner, not as an 
acknowledgement of the Other over and against the same, nor as respect for separation 
and difference, but rather as understanding, grasping, or comprehension. From the 
very beginning, according to Levinas, western philosophy has understood itself as an 
attempt to determine the Other (‘l’Autre’) by means of the Same (‘le Même’) in order 
to tailor down the Other to the size of the Same, and to find in oneself the measure of 
the Other. Stated alternately, philosophy is engaged “in reducing to the Same all that is 
opposed to it as Other”. Western philosophy presents itself mainly as the reduction of 
the Other to the Same.  
 
The manner or mode in which this reduction of the other takes place is through 
knowledge,which applies itself to drawing in and understanding reality in its 
conflicting multiplicity and diversity. And thanks to this knowledge, a scientifically 
founded technology is then developed, which must enable people to become ‘lord and 
master of the world’ (Descartes). Knowing is characterised by absoluteness: it does not 
want to leave anything out or to chance; it wants to investigate and understand 
everything, so that all becomes ‘manipulable,’ which means accessible to our actions. 
All things become forms of identity, sameness, and totality. 
 
The Logic of Essence: Identity and Totality 
From the beginning of his independent thought, as is apparent from the introduction to 
De l’existence à l’existant (1947), Levinas generally characterises the search for 
identity, sameness and totality, in other words the dynamics of identification and 
totalisation, with the Platonic term ‘Essence.’ He develops this concept more 
completely in his second major work Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence 
(1974).  
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Levinas does not make use of the term ‘Essence’ in the usual significance of ‘eidos’, 
‘quidditas’ or being-ness. To him, ‘Essence’ is the synonym for ‘being’, namely the 
Heideggerian Sein as distinct from the Seindes, the Latin esse as distinct from the 
scholastic ens. In order to present the content of ‘Essence,’ Levinas refers to the 
history of language, where it has been demonstrated how the suffix ‘ance’ is derived 
from ‘antia’ or ‘entia.’ Since suffixes are endings of the participle, they indicate an 
action, giving rise to abstract ‘action nouns’ (‘noms d'action’). The term ‘Essence’ 
should therefore be more clearly designated in this sense, just as Levinas obviously 
begins doing in his studies after Autrement qu'être.10 From this linguistic clarification 
regarding the use of “Essence” (or “essance”) as an action noun, it is apparent that 
Levinas means the following with regard to the term Essence: “the event or the process 
of esse.” We need to understand the term ‘to be’ literally in its sense as a verb: ‘to be’ 
as dynamic, process, fulfilment, ‘actus essendi.’ In this sense, Levinas labels the verb 
‘to be’ as ‘the verb of all verbs’ in contrast to its common superficial designation as 
‘auxiliary verb’. After all, the Greeks did not hesitate to speak of the ‘pure act’ with 
regard to being. The verb ‘to be’ does not primarily indicate a real or ideal entity, but 
the very process of being of this entity. In line with Plato and Heidegger, in no way 
whatsoever does Levinas mean by using the term Essence ‘to be’ the plain or merely 
formal, factual ‘there is’, namely that something ‘exists’, but rather the self-revealing 
act of being. By doing so, he takes over the qualitative-dynamic meaning of the 
Heideggerian term ‘Wesen’ (or ‘being’ as verb). 
 
Consequently, what is typical of ‘to be’ being understood thus is that it is universal and 
all-encompassing. As an event of being, it penetrates and bears all beings, and as such 
it comprises their unity. As the encompassing dynamism, it poses itself simply as 
totality: “the inescapable fate.” It leaves nothing outside of it, but draws all things into 
it so that, ultimately, nothing can escape. All that happens belongs to essence: “la 
totalité de lêtre serait l’essence même de l’Être.” Nothing is foreign to it. Everything 
falls under its jurisdiction, or at least can be reclaimed under it. It is thereby Essence as 
restoration. In this regard essence is also a striving for an ‘ultimate totality,’ meaning 
that it is “un Tout absolu” made explicit as history, being, world, God, wherein 
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everything will ultimately be integrated and wherein all plurality and difference will be 
brought to rest. 
 
Since Essence is a dynamic process of being, it implies, however, everything – not 
only quantitatively but also qualitatively. This leads us immediately to the second 
essential trait of Essence, namely identity. Indeed, nothing stands by itself 
independently or absolutely; something only appears as a mode of Essence wherein 
and whereby it unfolds itself. In spite of their diversity, all beings or data belong 
together. As modes of expression of Essence, they represent the same Order, that of 
being. Diversity counts only at first sight, since everything is ultimately a mode of 
realisation of Essence. In this regard, Essence not only encompasses everything but it 
also penetrates all things with its energy of being. It is totality because it reduces all 
things to sameness. As the all-penetrating and all-bearing foundation, being draws all 
things back to itself. However diverse and irreconcilable the data and events may seem 
at first sight, they have a common fate, namely the unfolding of Essence. That is why 
Levinas also speaks of the arrangement or conjunction of Essence. As the activity of 
being, it brings together (‘con-jonction’) all diversity into the encompassing unity that 
it is itself.  
 
One other equally important aspect of Essence as the process of being is the revelation 
of being – which makes one think of the ‘Lichtung des Seins’ of Heidegger. Essence is 
not only the effective unfolding of being but also the manifestation of being, or rather 
unfolding of being through revelation of being. Both are inextricably linked with each 
other. The event of being shows and proclaims itself outwardly in everything that is 
done, thought and said. All truth, intelligibility and language are likewise always the 
truth of being, the understanding of being, and the articulation of being. In this regard, 
Essence is affirmative, self- manifesting and self- confirming – in its 
phenomenological structure. 
 
In consequence, we can synthetically indicate the internal quality or nature of Essence 
(understood as adventure or epic) as being a conjunction of ‘interest’, literally ‘inter-
esse’: ‘to be in between’. It is not static being but an attempt to be (‘conatus essendi’), 
for example work, effort and energy, striving for self-preservation and the invincible 
tenacity of being: “The adventure of essence, which consists in persisting in essence 
and unfolding immanence.” Its identity is a striving for identity, an inaccessible 
attempt to remain itself and become itself even more. It is essential, structural 
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immanence. It does not want to leave anything outside of itself that could disturb or 
threaten it; it literally does not want to leave anything to chance, but wants to have and 
keep everything in hand. In short, it wants to be the one in all things. 
 
This means more precisely that Essence is anything but free of conflict. On the 
contrary, it fulfils itself precisely through these conflicts and clashes as a drama. The 
self-interest of being dramatises itself in and through individual selfishness competing 
with one another, the one against the other or all against all. Essence realises itself in 
and through the many forms of self-interest of beings, in this case of humans who, 
because of their mutual aggression, are at war with each other. War is the heroic deed 
of Essence itself. However, it does not remain in a condition of war. It immediately 
introduces reason into the situation in order to avoid or resolve the clashes between the 
beings. Reason invites them to make use of their intellect, to practise patience and 
desist from their mutual intolerance, entering in turn into an agreement of reasonable 
peace. This simply remains, however, an expression of the selfishness and tenacity of 
the being of Essence. Reasonable peace, as patience in struggle or postponement of 
violence, is calculation, intervention and politics, and thus also the organisation of a 
state. The struggle of all against all becomes exchange and trade. The clash in which 
all are with all because all are against all becomes mutual delimitation. 
Notwithstanding this change, however, there remains in force an interest of being of 
Essence since one offers compensation for the part of the interest of being that one 
renounces in the compromise in exchange for other, possible future advantages, which 
must be in balance with the patiently and politically arranged current concessions. 
Nothing is free: quid pro quo!  
 
Within the perspective of Essence, the sought-after peace merely remains a suppressed 
and constrained form of violence. Any peace achieved remains unstable; there is 
always the possibility of regressing into the war of all against all. Internally speaking, 
it is not protected against selfishness. Reasonable peace does not surpass the particular 
interests since it relies on these interests, which only imply mutual control and 
delimitation and no internal demolition or conversion. The achieved peace remains 
completely a product of Essence, notwithstanding the real difference that exists 
between the Essence in the time of war versus the Essence in the time of peace. The 
peace negotiated with each other remains in fact a war against the war, as is also 
apparent from the present-day arguments for ‘preventive war’ and ‘war on terrorism.” 
Even when it concerns a ‘just war,’ which may be considered as an improvement with 
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regard to initial universal violence, it still remains a war. In this regard, war remains 
the ‘extreme ratio’ of politics. As a war against war, it accords us a clear conscience, 
but it does not desist from being conflict and war. The resistance against the initial 
violence testifies only to a primordial and wild humanity that is merely prepared to 
momentarily suspend and moderate its aversion towards others, and precisely for that 
reason – jealous as it is of its tenacity of being – surrounds itself with military 
accolades and virtues. The tough self-complacency of energetic self-affirmation, by 
means of which Essence is Essence, remains unaffected, or rather, realises itself in a 
new and higher manner through its reasonable and justified struggle against violence 
and war.  
 
From this description of the drama of Essence, it becomes perfectly clear how the 
human ‘I’ is not only an exponent but at the same time an eminent expression of 
Essence. Since the ‘I’ is a return to oneself via self-consciousness, thought and 
language, Essence becomes, as it were, doubled. The ‘I’ is not only moved by the 
energy of being but also experiences and reveals it so that Essence arrives at a peak 
point or at fulfilment in the ‘I’. In this way, the ‘I’ is no mere coincidental given; on 
the contrary, it is an essential sublimation of Essence. As a conscious and free striving 
for identity, the ‘I’ is the indispensable sacrament of Essence. 
 
It is clear that the thought of Thomas Hobbes on humans as being ‘homo homini lupus’ 
– out of which the fear of the other ensues, as well as the war of all against all, which 
can only be controlled by the state as a powerful and threatening Leviathan – is simply 
an expression of Essence and thus of the dominant current in western thought. 
Similarly, Nazism is according to Levinas no ‘accident de parcours’ in western 
history. He situates Nazism as the extension of Essence and the conatus essendi, even 
though it cannot be denied that it is a supreme and diabolical expression of Essence. 
This thesis regarding the content of being of Nazism is clearly apparent in the (brief) 
Postscript written by Levinas in the second publication (1977) of the article “Quelques 
réflexions sur la philosophie de l’hitlérisme” (1934). Racism, which is inherent in 
Hitlerism, is a possibility “qui s’inscrit dans l’ontologie de l’Être, soucieux de l’être – 
de l’Être ‘dem es in seinem Sein um dieses Sein selbst geht’, selon l’expression 
heideggerienne”.  
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«Comprehensive» Knowledge 
A necessary condition for the possibility of this egocentric anthropocentrism – which 
in the West has become commonplace – is the "comprehending knowledge" which 
always tries to reduce the other to the immanence of the same; that is to say, it tries to 
reduce the other to oneself, as if the self is here and now the "master" of the world.  
Initially, the ego, free and happy in its enjoyment of the world, does not really reflect 
this. Enjoyment can only happen "unreflectively" as a living of one's own life in the 
all-embracing comfort of the cosmic womb of the elemental world. The necessity for 
reflection emerges when the ego feels itself threatened by the indeterminacy of the 
world and the uncertainty of its own future. Then it begins to feel concerned about 
itself, and to create some distance from itself in order to think about how it might 
respond to this threat to its happy effort of being. 
 
Properly speaking, this reflection is not a kind of peaceful withdrawal in order to 
consider how one might solve this problem, then deciding to act by securing control 
over reality with a dwelling, material possessions and labor. On the contrary, the ego 
moves immediately from its sense of insecurity into action, and it is in this action that 
reflection emerges as a means to help it. In the ego's inexperience, it displays an 
aggressive effort at a total grasp of the world which has the character of blind groping 
before it becomes self-assured. Lacking any "worldly knowledge," practical 
totalisation feels amateurish, and this still too much the pawn of chance and fate. The 
ego therefore looks for better means to solidify its position. It therefore also turns to 
knowledge in order to pursue a more methodical and systematic course in its economic 
concerns in order that it may return to mastery. Even better, in its more self-assured 
searching, there unfolds a measured and sophisticated insight which develops 
progressively into mature and structured objective knowledge. 
 
This inner combination of economic activity and objective knowledge flows from the 
fact that knowledge exhibits the same basic structure as does action – namely, the 
reduction of the Other to the Same. In the act of knowing, the ego tries to undo the 
objective unruliness of the world by surprising it in those facets where it is accessible 
through "in-sight." More specifically, this occurs through conceptualisation, 
categorisation, thematisation, systematisation and representation, which is also to be 
understood as representation of everything that had slipped away before, making it 
now available once more. The aim of all this is to "com-prehend" (also "con-cept"). 
By understanding the world – "grasping" it – the ego can place it in the service of its 
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own self-interested struggle to be, so that if it is at first dependent on the world, 
science and technology, as "grasping," this immediately reverses that condition into an 
ever greater independence and "infinite freedom." Quite naturally, knowledge moves 
out of itself toward the Other, but only with the aim of returning to itself "enriched" 
and stronger. The ego upholds itself precisely by "taking the Other in hand," and in 
"keeping it in hand" (main-tenance). Comprehensive knowledge aims finally at 
absoluteness (Hegel): it permits nothing to escape it, to remain outside it; it tries 
relentlessly and unsparingly to give everything a place, function or "meaning" within 
the world of its self-interest. Comprehensive knowing is thus far from being neutral 
and innocent, but is in fact a phenomenon of violence and power. It is a disrespectful 
and merciless "determination of the Other by the Same, without the Same being 
determined by the Other." 
 
This comprehensive knowing expresses itself in language, speech and writing, through 
which the intended object may be absorbed into a story. Think, for example, of the 
encyclopedias and stories that are collected in our libraries, and through which we may 
thus read and understand both the present and the past as if masters of the world and 
its history. In this way, we in a certain sense qualify for the otherness of the object. 
The source of its barbarian wildness – unconquerable and threatening – is undone, 
neutralized to an element of the horizon of meaning for a self-centered, thinking ego. 
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II. The Wisdom of Love  
Knowledge As the Mother of All Temptations 
While in the Greek tradition the irrationality of the ‘doxa’ is the mother of all 
temptations, Levinas believes that knowledge as ‘understanding’ (‘savoir’) is the 
temptation of all temptations (“la tentation de la tentation”). Indeed, we should not 
turn a blind eye to the negative effects of knowing. The kinds of regulative thinking 
and technocracy that have ensued from the West’s approach to knowing demonstrate 
the need for critical questioning regarding knowing as understanding. Has our 
enthusiasm and lust for knowledge not been too overwhelming? Even today, isn’t it 
still overpowering in the extreme? Knowledge is not only power but also the abuse of 
power. An immediate consequence of human comportment to knowing as 
understanding is the fact that we have been burdened with tremendous social ills 
during the previous century—the need for understanding has led to technical 
externalisation and the underlying ideology of manufacturability. The most notable 
examples along these lines are nuclear armaments, environmental pollution, the 
current explosion of medical (or the so-called “reproductive”) technologies, the 
attempt to acquire absolute medical power over death and dying and, last but not least,  
‘globalising’ neo-liberal economic technocracy. In this regard, a healthy suspicion of 
knowledge as understanding is indubitably in order, so long as we remain vigilant so 
as not to ignore its positive contributions, avoiding a possible relapse into a cheap 
cultural pessimism. To Levinas, knowing – as understanding - is characterised by 
absoluteness: it does not want to leave anything out or to chance; it wants to 
investigate and understand everything so that all becomes ‘manipulable’, in other 
words accessible to our actions. It therefore wants to keep sufficient distance from 
everything in order to be able to dispose of everything freely. In short, the temptation 
of knowledge is power or, stronger yet, omnipotence.  
Justice Precedes Truth 
Levinas’ radical critique of ‘comprehensive knowledge’ does not mean that he wants 
to return to ‘doxa’ and the sponaneity of feelings (“élan vital”). He is looking for 
another way of thinking, namely a non-reductive, non-violent and respectful manner of 
thinking. This brings him to the idea of the ethical relationship with the Other as basis 
and condition of possibility for that kind of thought: “la vérité suppose la justice”, as 
he says paradoxically: “truth presupposes justice.” Here we must be aware that 
Levinas understands the word ‘justice’ in a larger sense, namely as the ethical work of 
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responsibility by and for the Other: “Justice, the uprightness of the welcome made to 
the face (of the Other)”. Moreover, this justice is the context, basis and condition for 
truth and objective knowledge: “The essence of reason consists not in securing for 
man a foundation and powers, but in calling him in question and inviting him to 
justice”. Levinas also speaks of the “wisdom of love” that sidesteps choosing between 
the fruitless, spontaneous naiveté of irrational opinion and the arrogant, selfishly 
appropriating form of knowing that wants to understand everything. 
 
In order to show of what the unique wisdom of love consists, we must once again 
consult Emmanuel Levinas, who has explicitly reflected on this ‘thinking of love.’ His 
entire way of thought may perhaps be traced back to this notion. In his second major 
work, Otherwise Than Being, he discusses the compelling idea of “the wisdom of love 
at the service of love.” As involvement with the Other rather than with oneself, love is 
a very special attention for the Other, and this is expressed as a dedication ‘despite 
oneself’ to the fate of the Other. This turning towards the Other implies an openness, 
literally an ‘ac-know-ledgement’ towards the Other. This ethical attitude leads to the 
authentic knowing and confirming of the Other as Other. One should take note at this 
juncture that this knowledge is not added from the outside, but rather flows forth from 
the practice of love itself. As the highest form of non-indifference, love is simply the 
paying attention to an Other rather than to oneself. As regards respect, not only is it an 
honest manner of approach to the Other, but it is also an open and honest way of 
seeing (in the literal sense, thus meaning knowing). 
 
Precisely for these reasons, the ethical relationship to the Other is not only the 
foundation of truth; it is the foundation of all human civilisation worthy of the name. 
The ‘longing for the Other rather than for oneself’ is like ‘thinking-of-the-Other’, the 
essence of love. That is why we call it an ‘other-wise’ love: a love that bears its own 
wisdom and also substantiates and displays itself as love in and through its execution. 
It gives rise to thought in a ‘self-willed’ way. The quite unique, irreducible meaning 
that reveals itself through its ‘lived life’ surpasses the love of wisdom, although it 
needs this wisdom in thinking in order to make itself accessible ‘in Greek’ with all its 
risks of misunderstanding and reduction. The tragedy of this obfuscation throughout its 
indispensable thinking necessitates in turn not only corrections and ‘re-visions’ but 
also an unending return, an endlessness that ‘makes itself endless’ – a humble return to 
the source, love itself, as the first and ultimate experience of ‘decisive’ truth and 
meaning. 
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The Other As My Master, My Teacher 
When I reflect on the meaning of meeting or encountering someone else, I start 
spontaneously from within myself. I only encounter the Other at the moment when I 
catch sight of the Other. When I approach the Other, I look at the Other. I observe the 
Other and thus I form for myself and image of the Other. On the basis of my sensory 
perception, I try to discover and map out all sorts of aspects and characteristics of the 
Other in order thus to arrive at a general impression. I see a nose, lips, mouth, forehead 
and facial expression, in short a physiognomy, and thus the Other becomes visible and 
recognisable to me, distinguishable from all others. However, aside from the physical 
appearance of the Other, one also has the Other’s personality and social background, 
culture and milieu, by means of which the Other appears, or becomes, literally, an 
‘appearance’ or a ‘phenomenon.’ We form for ourselves a psychological and 
sociological image of the Other whereby we are able to situate the Other within a 
larger whole. In short, the Other thus becomes visible.  
 
‘Seeing’ the other also makes it possible for us to be able to assess and understand the 
Other. We provide ourselves with an access to the Other by means of concepts and 
categories. We categorise the Other by placing him or her in a category, an a-priori 
idea or ‘being’, whereby the question as to the ‘what’ (‘quiddity’) can be answered. 
This implies a specific conception of truth. A view can only be true if it corresponds 
adequately – or indeed as adequately as possible – with reality, namely with what is 
seen. By means of seeing and understanding things, I also acquire access to them, and 
I can also exercise power over them. They are ‘given’ and delivered unto me, whereby 
I also understand them in the sense that I grasp them. This also applies for the person 
whom I encounter observantly and deductively, as exploration and investigation. By 
means of getting to know the Other, we also get to know how to behave towards him 
or her and how to be able to approach the Other with a certain type of knowledge. 
 
The consequence of this is that we reduce and affix the Other onto our own 
measurement, which is concisely expressed by Levinas as follows: “the reduction of 
the Other to the Same”. The Other is reduced to its image and appearance, which 
precisely forms the core of what is understood in the Jewish tradition as idolatry. 
When I attempt to gain a view of the Other and, in so doing, try to know and to 
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understand, the other becomes a part of my horizon and world. Knowledge that rests 
on representation looks at the Other in such a way that the Other is rid of its 
uniqueness and alterity and becomes a part of my ordering integration and 
determination.  
 
Indeed, it is a simple fact of our daily experience that the Other, on the basis of our 
observation, may be described and understood, but the ‘face’ of the Other according to 
Levinas consists precisely in that the Other cannot be reduced to its ‘face’, its 
expressive form, its image. Precisely for this reason, Levinas provocatively states that 
the Other is invisible. This does not mean that the Other would in fact not be visible, 
but rather that the Other is irreducible to its image. The Other can never coincide with 
its appearance nor with the representations which we are able to produce of the Other 
for ourselves. Even though it shows itself in its appearance, it shows itself by 
simultaneously withdrawing itself from this appearance. The Other is essentially 
‘anachoresis’ or ‘kenosis.’ The Other appears by means of already ridding itself of its 
appearance in its appearing. Stated even more emphatically, the Other is not only that 
which in fact is not (yet) made known, but also that which is and remains in principle 
unknowable. In the evidence of its visible presence, the Other means at the same time 
the mystery of its absence. Or stated another way, in its appearance the Other reveals 
immediately the mystery of its disappearance, its falling-in-a-faint, its passing out, its 
inaccessibility. The image that the Other provides for us to see is marked by an 
essential failure, an essential iconoclasm, an unmistakable erasure of itself. And this, 
we must repeat, is not about a temporary but rather a definitive absence, an absence 
that can never be absence enough. In this regard, the Other will always be an 
adventure, an adventure of the future, and this in the most literal sense of the word. 
The Other appears as the ever-coming, literally as the one who still must come, which 
is evocatively expressed in French as ‘à-venir’ and in Latin as ‘ad-ventus.’ The Other 
is literally an unending future in the sense of ‘coming-to-be’: never simply the present, 
never simply here and now, never fully present, transparent, available, never 
completely accessible. In this regard, the Other is the ‘extravagant’, that which does 
not fit, that which is beyond all measure, utterly inadequate: unending disproportion 
and disparity, unable to be grasped or seized. The Other is essentially transcendent 
with regard to every possible image and every possible representation: inaccessible 
and unassailable, the ‘foreign’ par excellence. And that, according to Levinas, is 
precisely the alterity of the Other, or rather, it is precisely the way in which the alterity 
of the Other unfolds itself dynamically and unceasingly. The Other is the unending 
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enigma that leaves us time and again in confusion. This entails that we will try to 
understand and grasp the Other in a more forced and stubborn way, but in so doing 
will the unseizable alterity of the other simply become greater. This means that we (as 
long as we start from ourselves towards the Other – in other words, develop a view of 
the Other based on our own observation and representation) will continue committing 
violence against the Other. 
 
That is why Levinas has resolutely opted for not only abandoning but also radically 
reversing the current perspective of the encounter with the Other. He no longer starts 
from an egocentric perspective based on the observing, representing and grasping I, 
but rather based on the perspective of the Other. We must allow that the encounter 
with the Other does not begin from ourselves, but rather from the Other. 
 
The indestructible inaccessibility and ungraspability of the Other means that the 
initiative can no longer come from me, but will have to proceed from the Other. Well 
then, the manner in which the Other conducts itself towards me is not only a negative 
movement of ‘unending withdrawal’ but also a positive movement of ‘direct self-
expression and turning towards,’ called by Levinas the ‘epiphany of the face.’ The 
Other not only withdraws itself from its appearance but also breaks through its 
appearance as the unique Other that immediately directs itself out of itself towards me. 
The way it breaks through its form – image and appearance – and presents itself is, 
according to Levinas, precisely the ‘face’ of the Other. The concrete manner in which 
the Other as face comes to me is with words. The Other turns towards me by means of 
speaking to me. The Other is literally ‘revelation’: the Other reveals itself by means of 
expressing itself. Moreover, this expression does not stand in and of itself, but takes 
place relationally: ‘face à face.’ The Other expresses itself by means of turning 
towards me, and the first content of this revelation is not ‘who’ or ‘what’, the content 
of the Other, but the fact of its otherness itself. It is not what the Other’s face says that 
is essential, but the fact that it speaks. The fact of its expression and revelation is the 
communication of its very presence, of its epiphany as the unique, irreducible Other. 
The Other comes directly towards me and addresses me without digressions, and by 
means of addressing me, the Other also enters into direct contact with me. Hence is the 
priority of the spoken word, or that which is expressed and addressed. The spoken 
word has a surplus over the written word, which makes the spoken word into a 
coalesced objectivity. When the Other speaks, it assists itself. The spoken word does 
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not stand in and of itself, but is inseparably bound to the one who speaks it. The 
speaking Other can through its utterances – its expressions – assist and defend itself by 
means of providing the necessary explanations and corrections. The written word can 
no longer review, nuance nor revise itself. Only the speaking Other can prevent its 
being reduced to its utterances. The spoken word thus realises a radical transcendence. 
 
This leads Levinas to label the epiphany of the face as teaching. By means of speaking 
to me, the Other arouses in me something new. I do not discover something that was 
already slumbering within me beforehand, but I become – in spite of myself – 
confronted with the heteronomous fact of the otherness of the Other. In this regard the 
Other is my ‘teacher’ who, by means of speaking to me, brings me into contact with its 
non-extraditable alterity, which can only be acknowledged when it is respected. It is 
then no coincidence that Levinas qualifies the other in a Jewish way as being my 
‘rabbi,’ my ‘master,’ who teaches me authoritatively. I cannot predict nor foresee the 
speaking – the revelation – of the Other, I do not have a handle on the Other, and that 
is precisely its alterity that ‘makes me wise.’ 
 
This means that my relationship towards the Other can only take place as a response, 
which Levinas calls (with an unmistakable play on words) ‘responsibility.’ What is 
crucial in this is that this response can no longer be based on observation and view, but 
on hearing and listening. To state it in a paradoxical manner: when I see the Other, I 
hear the (inaudibly whispered) word that breaks through the appearance of the Other 
and addresses me and calls me to acknowledge and do justice to the Other in its 
otherness. It becomes clear from all this how, in the encounter with the Other, seeing 
no longer is central, but hearing and listening to the word of the other is. The Other 
enters into a relationship with me by means of addressing me, and it is thus I become 
the addressee who literally needs to respond with a countering word. In the 
conversation that begins with the Other, I am no longer the first and the origin, the 
‘archè’ or ‘principle’ to which everything refers; I am no longer the one who designs, 
but the one who receives, who listens and who – quite literally – needs to ‘obey.’ 
 
In other words, real dialogue does not rest on the reciprocity between two equals who, 
on the basis of a harmonious agreement, find themselves in the other. Authentic 
conversation rests on the asymmetry of two unequals, or rather of two irreducible 
Others, whereby the one speaks and the other responds. Through the word of the face, 
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I am put in my place and am questioned as to my self-complacency. I am called to let 
go of my representations, images and views of the Other so that space would come to 
exist in order to learn something new from the Other. It should be clear from now on 
that a real conversation does not begin from myself, as if I would be the first to address 
the Other and express myself, which the Other ‘may’ take up thereafter. The Other 
precedes me and is the first to speak to me. Everything I need to know about the Other 
I learn from and by means of the Other. 
 
III. Social, Economic, Political Justice and Reason 
From Plurality to Justice 
Not everything has been said about the responsibility by and for the Other. Levinas has 
extended the face-to-face to all Others, first hesitatingly in Totality and Infinity, and then 
even more explicitly starting from Otherwise than Being, but never in a separate 
treatment, rather more as a consequence of his ethical view. It is important to emphasise 
this, because all too often one remains focused solely on his views on interpersonal 
relationships, while his views on society and politics really elevates his ethics to the real 
level.11 
 
The responsibility by and for the Other displays an infinite character, not only 
qualitatively but also quantitatively. It is not only the one Other, but also all Others who 
fall under my responsibility. The Other and I are not alone in the world. There are the 
many Others, both the near as well as the far, the present as well as the absent. Levinas 
indicates this synthetically as the fact of ‘the third party’ (‘le tiers’). This implies that the 
responsibility for the Other must develop itself into a universal and encompassing 
responsibility. 
 
Yet the question is how this responsibility for all may be realised. Its infinite character 
immediately poses a difficult problem. As long as the responsibility only runs from me 
to the one Other, it has a univocal sense. But from the moment of the entrance of the 
third party, the question arises: ‘Who is most near to me? Who comes first: the 
neighbour or the third party?’ This conflict in responsibility itself calls for the 
necessity to confront and to judge, to weigh and to consider, to classify, to make 
                                                 
11 See our systematic development of Levinas’ social, economic and political thought in: The Wisdom of Love in 
the Service of Love. Emmanuel Levinas on Justice, Peace, and Human Rights, Milwaukee, Marquette University 
Press, 2002, 213 pp. 
  42
distinctions, to determine priorities and urgencies, in short to arrange and to organise. 
My universal responsibility obliges me ‘to compare the incomparable’. 
 
With the entrance of the third party, the construction of a just ‘coexistence’ thus 
becomes necessary, whereby the relationships are ordered according to a reasonable 
equality and fairness, meaning to say as justly as possible for everyone. The third party 
is the beginning of a sharing, social justice. Only thus can the initial (non-intentional) 
violence that is attached to the exclusive face-to-face be repaired. Whoever does 
everything for the one Other thereby does injustice inadvertently to the Others, more 
precisely by neglecting them or even excluding them. In this regard, goodness itself is 
marked by violence, at least when it is absolutely and completely sought after in itself. 
 
 
Justice in the Strict Sense of the Word 
In this context of the third, the concept of justice receives a stricter clarification than it 
has in the context of the direct I-Other relationship, as Levinas himself admits: "The 
word 'justice' is indeed much more in order when it is a matter of 'moderation' rather 
than my 'subordination' to the Other. When moderation is necessary, there must also be 
comparison and identity. Consequently, the word 'justice' is more applicable to my 
relation with the third than to my relation with the Other”. In the period of Totality and 
Infinity (1961), Levinas uses the word justice as a synonym for the ethical, for 
responsibility, for the rights of the Other in the broad sense. In his introduction to the 
German translation of that work (1987),12 Levinas explicitly states that it is better to 
clearly distinguish between love of neighbor, mercy and justice, which is a matter of 
the third, and the implied need for reflection and arrival at some sort of balance. At the 
same time, he repeats that there is a close and forceful connection between these two 
emotions. This is expressed unmistakably in the universality of the Face, which points 
in its essential structure toward all others. The Face, Levinas has said, is the face of 
faces (le visage des visages). Hence is responsibility for the third, understood as justice 
in the strict sense of the word, a direct extension "original sociality," of the creatural 
responsibility-to-and-for-the-Other, understood as justice in the broad and inclusive 
sense of the word. In order to avoid confusing the two, we might therefore reserve for 
the domain of the third the expression "social justice." The third, Levinas has said, is 
the beginning of a relative and distributed justice. It is her entrance on the scene which 
                                                 
 12 Reprinted in Entre Nous. Essais sur le penser-à-l'autre, Paris: Grasset, 1991, pp. 249-252. 
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makes necessary a "just co-existence" which regulates and structures, or perhaps 
better, orders a reasonable – a rationally mediated – equality and equanimity. From 
this it follows immediately that I cannot restrict my original responsibility for the 
Other solely to the alleviation of concrete need hic et nunc. On the contrary, the 
universal and all-encompassing character of my responsibility requires me to also take 
account of the structural context in which this need presents itself. It is possible that in 
the long run I can really do something for the Other only if I enter into the "system" in 
which her need presents itself or which in fact causes it. Charity must become 
structural justice if its ethical nature is to become truly effective.  
 
Justice in the strict sense, however, means a continual correction and limitation of the 
ethical asymmetry between me and the Other. I, too, am an Other for the Other and for 
the third. The original inequality of my infinite responsibility for the unique Other is 
corrected in this sense of the word through the fact that I, too, fall under the 
responsibility of Others. Through the presence of a third, I am an Other like the 
Others, that is to say, their equal. Or better, we are fellows to one another. We stand 
equally before one another. It is as if we appear together only before a tribunal which 
judges us equally. With the appearance of the third, symmetry enters proximity, but 
without abolishing the difference, the ethical non-indifference. Equality constitutes our 
co-presence: we are "together-in-one-place," "as one" and without hierarchy. This 
makes reciprocity possible; equality must now be situated on the level of "social 
structure." The fact that we are on equal footing with one another means that the Face 
of the Other is undone from its transcendence and always withdrawing "invisibility." It 
is instead presented as a theme, or rather re-presented, situated in the order of the now, 
the present. We become objectively accessible to one another; we fall under one 
another's objectivating intentionality. Synchronised co-existence undoes the Face of its 
Face-ness: "le Visage se dé-visage". More specifically, this consists in withdrawing 
from the Other her irreducibility and incomparable unicity, defining her instead by her 
individuality, which can be considered as a single instance of a wider genre, hence 
comparable, susceptible to measurement and objectivation. While the Other is and 
remains unique, she is also, precisely due to her status as a third, part of a general type 
or sort. The Other as unique is pre-logical, not of "wild thinking," but that which 
escapes and evens precedes all thinking. But the third signifies the return of the 
logical, that is to say of conceptualising, comparing, categorising, apportioning, and 
ordering, in short generalising. 
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The Social Meaning of Knowledge, Science, and Language 
This implies the necessity of representation and objectivating thought, and in turn 
"theory." From the moment that we are three, there emerges a need to critically reflect 
and understand. This formation of theory is incarnated and further elaborated upon in 
philosophy and the sciences. 
 
Of course, reflective thematisation is impossible without verbalisation. Concerning the 
third, there also emerges objective mediation via the system of language: "Were there 
only two of us on earth, there would be no words: one would not speak. Objective 
language begins only when there are three”. Reflection on the coordination and 
ordering of responsibilities can take place concretely only through the means of a 
verbal communication no longer simply a "communication of communication itself" 
(as with the Face), but one that involves the objective announcement of messages and 
content. In order for this communication to proceed as smoothly as possible, one 
makes spontaneous recourse to written language – to objective reports, contracts, and 
contracts, reference books and "writings" (books, letters, pamphlets, articles, etc.), all 
of which Levinas characterises together as "the Said" (le Dit). 
 
It is clear that this part of Levinas' analysis aims at revaluating the negative evaluation 
placed on noetic totalisation, here to be conceived as a means of social ordering or 
organisation in line with responsibility-to-and-for-the-Other. He thus also takes the 
view that those of us who carry on that noetic and verbal totalisation flirt with 
nihilism, for the latter denies not only the worth of consciousness, thought, philosophy, 
and science, but also the very responsibility which require them to take shape and be 
achieved. Nonetheless, it is also necessary to constantly unmask, or "Unsay" (dédit), 
the objective Said of reflection, comparison, judgment, coordination and agreement, 
since the moment in which they make possible the achievement of universal 
responsibility is also a moment of betrayal, of confinement of the pre-original 
"Saying" (le Dire), one-to-the-Other, back into the totality of the Said. Furthermore, 
this ambiguous moment, in which the first word of responsibility, the "Here I am" 
which expresses the ego's responsibility-to-the-Other-and-for-the-Other, is 
simultaneously the moment of responsibility for the other Others. The "here I am" is at 
once a response to my neighbor and an opening to responsibility for all. In my 
responsibility as "one-for-the-Other," it is also necessary to take account of the rights 
of all third parties. 
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According to Levinas, it is precisely here that one finds all of the riches of Athens, 
with its love of wisdom, knowledge, and understanding. However, this love of 
wisdom, this philos-sophia, does not come first, but only after or in light of the rather 
different riches of Jerusalem, with its wisdom of love, with the "priority of the Other 
as command" (in the Torah), founding all thought and theory. While Greek wisdom 
therefore does not have priority, and even depends on Biblical wisdom in order to 
achieve its truth and justice, it is still, according to Levinas, indispensable to us. To the 
degree that it, too, is inspired by "extravagant love of the Other," it shares in the 
wisdom of love – or even better, it becomes the wisdom of love in the strictest sense of 
the word. Regarding content, it is not only the Greek heritage which stands in need of 
the Biblical tradition, but also Biblical wisdom which needs Greek wisdom. 
 
 
A Social, Economic and Political Responsibility 
There still is more, however. Since we cannot reach immediately the absent third 
party, we must realise justice by means of ‘mediations’ (‘Vermittlungen’). We can 
only substantiate concretely our care for the Others when we introduce between 
ourselves and the absent third parties ‘intermediate terms’ by means of which we do 
reach them indirectly, yet in a real way. These intermediate terms are all sorts of forms 
of social, economic, financial, legal, political structures, institutions, organisms, 
agencies and systems, both infra-national as well as national, international and global. 
The third party, in other words, obliges the development of social and political 
structures, meaning to say ‘states’ and ‘united states.’ In this sense, state and politics 
are for Levinas utterly positive and, ethically speaking, they count as an absolute 
obligation on condition, however, that they are inspired by the heteronomous 
responsibility of the one for the Other. 
 
But there is a negative side to every socio-political design of our universal 
responsibility. However ethically necessary it may be, it can never have the last word. 
State and society constantly run the risk of deteriorating. Since they take shape in laws, 
structures, organisations and institutions, for instance in education, healthcare and 
social welfare or in the banking system, they inadvertently display an objective, distant 
and anonymous character. Their nameless objectivity is the very cause of why subjects 
are no longer treated as separate persons, but rather as elements that may be classified 
under a generalising term or totality according to their function, status, profession, 
studies, possessions and assets, etcetera. In this sense, the objective generalisation that 
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the socio-political societal order must carry out in order to guarantee its task of justice 
for everyone (also for the third parties) implies the constant threat of structural 
violence and tyranny, which rids individuals of their irreducible separateness and 
alterity. With this, we touch upon the drama of every socio-economic and politically 
organised justice that finds its origin, nonetheless, in the ethical appeal of the Face, 
namely the drama whereby it turns itself against this Face.  
 
That is why no single socio-economic and political order gets the last word. A 
totalitarian regime is precisely such an order that raises itself to a definitive regime. In 
the twentieth century Stalinism has made it clear how pernicious such a regime can be, 
especially when it refers to the ethical care of the proletariat. In other words, Stalinism 
was the terror of the perversion of its own ethical involvement. It turned against its 
own original ‘good will’ precisely because it had made absolute its choice for the 
vulnerable Other into an final system of welfare.13 This is the worst that can happen to 
ethics, namely that in the name of the Face one creates a socio-economic and political 
system and, furthermore, proclaims it as being the absolute good. The good is literally 
overturned into ‘the evil of the good’ and thus ends up in the ‘terror of the good’ 
whereby ethics itself is destroyed in the name of ethics. 
 
That is why the socio-economic and political realisations must be questioned and 
improved on time and time again, first and foremost through an even better form of 
justice (une justice toujours meilleure). The options, priorities and achieved balances, 
that are established in the educational system, in healthcare and welfare, create ever 
new injustices. Hence an even better socio-economic and political justice is necessary, 
which very attentively attempts to identify, prevent or remedy – as a critical corrective 
– every degeneration of the structural socio-economic and political justice. This is only 
possible in a non-totalitarian, ‘free’ regime that proceeds from the principle that the 
justice achieved is always incomplete.  
 
Alongside this ‘permanent socio-economic and political disillusionment’ Levinas also 
pleads for an ‘ethical individualism.’ By this he means the irreplaceable role the 
interpersonal responsibility of the ‘one-for-the-Other’ has to play in just structures and 
institutions. There are tears that no single functionary of a socio-economic and 
political system can see, namely the tears of the one, unique Other. Therefore, in order 
                                                 
13 Similar ideas can be found in the work of Tzvetan TODOROV, Mémoire du mal, tentation du bien, Paris, 
Laffont, 2000, 476 pp. 
  47
to make sure that structures and organisations work in a humane way, the singular 
responsibility of everyone, for everyone, before everyone is and remains – over and 
above every system – necessary. In every social, economic and political system 
individual consciences are necessary which, by their level of physical sensitivity, are 
in turn sensitive to the pain of singular Others, both near and far, and are 
unconditionally concerned with their fate. Only they are capable of seeing the violence 
that ensues from the proper functioning of social, economic and political rationality 
itself. In this regard, Levinas speaks about the ethical necessity of ‘the small goodness’ 
(‘la petite bonté’). He calls it small because it runs from the unique ‘I’ to the unique 
‘Other.’ It does what no single system is in a position to do, namely to face and meet 
the needs of the unique Other. This goodness is small also because it is anything but 
spectacular. It wants to be anything but total. It is about a modest, partial goodness, 
with no pretensions of solving everything once and for all and thus creating paradise 
on earth. It does what it can with full enthusiasm and dedication, without wanting to 
get everything in its grasp.  
 
 
IV. An Ethical Redefinition of the Subject 
Thus we arrive once again at the responsibility by and for the Other, which not only is 
– or rather should be and remain – the origin, inspiration and test of every social, 
economic and political order, but also surpasses it.  
 
There still is one aspect of this responsibility which we have not yet illuminated until 
now. We have described the ‘wholly Other’ as Master and source or truth and, 
likewise, we have sufficiently set out the description of the ‘I’ as ‘responsibility for the 
Other’. What now remains for us to do is to explain the redefinition of the subject that 
is implied therein.  
 
All that we have said till now about the Face of the Other that appeals to my 
responsibility is something we can only state when we correct the first description of 
the ‘I’ as ‘selfish attempt at being’. Upon closer inspection, it becomes apparent how 
the determining of the ‘I’ as attempt at being is literally superficial; in other words, it 
remains at the surface and does not do justice to what takes place, or rather what has 
already taken place, in the ‘depths’ – in the intimacy – of the ‘I.’  
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In order to clarify what we mean by this, we must return to our description of the 
ethical encounter with the Face of the Other. We have described this encounter as the 
heteronomous happening of being touched by the vulnerable and injured Face of the 
Other. We are literally ‘moved’ and affected by the epiphany of the Other, so much so 
even that we no longer can remain indifferent. In spite of ourselves, we are appealed to 
by the naked Face of the Other, literally called to responsibility. In order to be able to 
be touched by the fate and the suffering of the Other, we must be touchable. So that 
that which happens would be able to happen, namely the ‘hetero-affection’ by the 
Face, we must assume that we are ‘affectable.’ By this, we clearly move on from a 
phenomenological, descriptive level to a transcendental level in the Kantian sense of 
the term: in the depths of the phenomenon, we search for its condition of possibility. 
Even before I take up the responsibility for the Other, I must already be responsible. In 
this regard Levinas draws attention to the ending of the French term ‘responsabilité’: 
‘bilité’ refers indeed to the possibility of giving an answer, to the being made capable 
of responding effectively to the Face of the Other. I am entrusted to the Other beyond 
my own initiative, and thereby I am capable of dedicating myself to the fate of the 
Other. In other words, in heteronomous responsibility I discover myself as already 
marked by an event that radically precedes me. In order to know my true ground, I 
must return to before or under ‘my-self’, to an immemorial past. The passive being 
affected by the fate of the Other is the very intrigue of my subjectivity: being moved in 
spite of myself, ‘animation’ and ‘inspiration’, in the sense of ‘being enraptured and 
enthused’ by the Other than myself. The responsibility by the naked face does not 
remain exterior to me, but fulfils itself in me, or rather has already fulfilled itself in me 
as ‘awakening’ (‘éveil’), stronger still as ‘already being awakened’ (‘déjà être éveillé’) 
to responsibility, which I myself naturally then must take up and substantiate. 
 
This requires a redefinition of the ‘I’, which we initially – in the context of Essence – 
have characterised as ‘conatus essendi’, meaning to say as attempt and effort in order 
to be. This description of the ‘I’ as ‘being’ on the basis of what simply seems evident 
in our daily observation is too narrow in the sense that it concerns a half, and thus 
incorrect, truth (a half-truth is more dangerous than a whole lie since it is more 
misleading). On the basis of the transcendental question above regarding what makes 
possible the factual being touched by the Face, namely the affectability of the ‘I’, 
Levinas arrives at stating – especially in Otherwise Than Being – that the being of the 
‘I’ is not simply ‘to be’, but in its ‘being’ is already ‘otherwise than being’. According 
to Levinas – and this is, in our opinion, the core of his thought – with the 
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characterisation of the ‘I’ as self-interest and attempt at being we have neglected 
something essential, namely ‘something’ that is already at work in the attempt at being 
itself. In the attempt at being itself, and not outside of it, there is a scruple at work that 
questions the conatus essendi from the inside out and breaks it open towards the Other 
rather than at itself. The word ‘scruple’ literally means a ‘pebble in the shoe’, whereby 
someone cannot remain standing but is ‘moved’ or ‘prodded’ to take the next step. 
Hence Levinas also speaks, not coincidentally, about “the Other in the Same.” This 
scruple, which moves the attempt at being itself, comes to light by means of the 
encounter with the Face but is not introduced or created by this encounter. The scruple 
about oneself, that is at work in the conatus essendi itself from the inside out and 
through which the ‘I’ is already linked with the other than itself, manifests itself 
however as an ethical event. The involvement with the other than oneself is no ‘natural 
necessity’, just like indeed the attempt at being is no ‘natural necessity’ in the sense 
that the human person cannot do otherwise than choose for the Other or for 
themselves. The ‘dedication in spite of myself to the Other than myself’ fulfils itself 
precisely as a scruple, as a questioning, as an uneasiness of the attempt at being with 
itself. As conatus essendi, I am not at ease with my own dynamism of being. I realise 
that the obviousness of my perseverance of being and self-unfolding is not so obvious. 
In the exercise of my attempt at being, it dawns upon me that my attempt at being left 
to itself is brutal and leaves corpses behind it left and right. Even though there is a 
certain ‘natural impulse or urge’ in the conatus to think and to act according to its own 
interest, it is indeed not left at the mercy of itself as a mechanism that is unavoidable. 
Precisely because it is characterised by an internal scruple or restraint on itself, it is 
ethical, whereby it surpasses nature – understood as natural necessity. By means of the 
crisis that it bears within itself – ‘la crise de l’être’ – it is not left to its own mercy as a 
fatality but it can surpass itself towards the Other further than itself. By means of the 
internal scruple, it is made capable of choosing for the self-interest, or of choosing for 
the ‘otherwise than being’, whereby it surpasses itself as ‘involvement with the Other 
than itself’. It can choose simply to be and indulge in its self-interest at the cost of or 
in compromise with others, but it can also choose to substantiate its otherwise than 
being in caring responsibility for the Other, both in the singular – interpersonal – as 
well as in the plural – social, economic and political, national, international and 
worldwide. In this regard, the ‘I’ is an ethically ‘equi-vocal’ being: at the same time 
being and otherwise than being, without it being like a stone that unavoidably falls 
downward, it must fall in one or the other direction. In this manner the attempt at being 
in itself is likewise already marked and ‘touched’ by the ‘otherwise than being’ or ‘the 
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Good above being’, not as a necessity but as a possibility and a capacity of being able 
to be appealed to. Levinas labels this as ‘the miracle of the human’: the Other in the 
Same, transcendence in immanence: the ethical motherhood of “having-the-other-in-
one’s-skin”. In this regard the Good in my self reveals itself, not in the active 
consciousness of myself as ‘intéressement’, but deeper than this consciousness in my 
‘soul’ wherein I ‘in spite of myself’ am inspired towards the Other.14 With this we 
touch the soul of the ‘I’, namely the animation and inspiration by the radical Other. 
Furthermore, Levinas qualifies this ‘in spite of myself for the Other’ in even more 
radical terms as hostage and expiation, and as substitution – a central category in his 
thought on the subject. By substitution he does not mean in the active sense of the free 
‘I’ itself taking the place of the Other, but rather in the passive sense of ‘being put in 
the place of the Other’, or stated even more emphatically, ‘being already put in the 
place of the Other.’ This implies that the ‘I’ no longer stands in the nominative but in 
the accusative, as it is literally apparent in the French expression: “me voici.” In 
contrast to the English expression “here I am,” whereby the ‘I’ stands in the active 
nominative, we find the ‘I’ in “me voici” in the passive accusative, meaning to say in a 
grammatical form for which no nominative form even exists. In spite of myself, I 
already stand – before every choice made by myself – before the demand of the Face, 
whereby I discover myself as the one who ‘from elsewhere’ has already been called. I 
am already a passive ‘me’ even before I can become an active ‘I’. That is precisely 
what we wanted to express in the title of our article: ‘The Other and Me’. Levinas also 
calls it the createdness of the ethical subject: we are created as ‘our brother’s keeper’ 
even before we ourselves are capable of having any idea, longing or intention of 
wanting to be such a keeper. 
 
It is clearly apparent from all this how Levinas, who initially appeared to us as a thinker à 
la Hobbes, namely through his linking of the ‘I’ as conatus essendi with Essence, 
ultimately manifests himself as a radical anti-Hobbesian precisely through his thought 
about the Face and responsibility. As ‘being for the Other in spite of myself,’ in other 
words being responsible before every free act of choice, I am in my being marked by the 
otherwise than being. The mystery of my being is that in the depths of my being, 
something else has already taken place whereby I irreversibly stand turned towards the 
                                                 
14 According to Levinas, the idea of God as the Good in me reveals itself in here as well. In this regard, I am in 
my ‘spirit’ marked by God Himself, who entrusts to me the fate of the Other and calls me to unconditional 
responsibility. Considering the limitations of this article, we cannot enter further into this matter here, and must 
refer the reader to: L’idée du Bien en moi. Penser-à-Dieu d’après Levinas, in: F. COPPENS, Variations sur 
Dieu. Langages, silences, pratiques, Bruxelles, Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, 2005, pp. 197-222. 
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Other. The being of my ‘I’ is at first sight a fear for my own being, but upon closer 
inspection this is already marked by a deeper fear, namely the fear for the Other, in the 
singular and in the plural, both near and far, today and in the future. The fate of the Other 
is the scruple in myself whereby my being is an intrigue, namely a sensibility by the 
Other in which I am already – in my being – attuned to the Other.  
 
 
 
